Missouri Law Review
Volume 16
Issue 3 June 1951

Article 6

1951

Economics of Fair Charges for Consumer Loans, The
Miller Upton

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Miller Upton, Economics of Fair Charges for Consumer Loans, The, 16 MO. L. REV. (1951)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss3/6

This Conference is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Upton: Upton: Economics of Fair Charges

THE ECONOMICS OF FAIR CHARGES FOR CONSUMER LOANS
MILLER UPTON*

THE SETTING TO THE PROBLEM

The term fair chtarges in the title of this article defines the scope of the
problem with which we are confronted. It suggests that the rate charged must
be fair to all parties involved: the borrower, the lender, and the community.
That is, it should not be arbitrarily levied but rather established in keeping
with the needs and protection of the borrower, the operating costs and necessary profit margin of the lender, and the need for the service for the welfare
of the community. The question of fairness to the borrower, however, is not
as directly involved. The various usury statutes have long been adopted to
accomplish this objective. The need for special consideration of the consumer loan operator, on the other hand, exists because the maximum rates
allowed under most usury statutes are not in keeping with the realities of
his operating cost requirements. And to the extent that the availability of
the service on a high plane is directly dependent upon its economic justification, the welfare of the borrower and the community pre inseparable from
that of the lender.
In view of the authoritative work that has already been done in the
field of such qualified and unbiased organizations as the Russell Sage Foundation, the National Bureau of Economic Research, and the New York
Banking Department in support of the need for special rates on consumer
loans in excess of the general legal maxima, it might seem that further attention to the matter is unnecessary.1 However, the fears and prejudices surrounding the whole problem are so deep that extreme caution on the part of
legislators is to be expected, and patient retelling of the story is not only to
be accepted but desired. But of even more importance than this is the need
to analyze and discuss the problem with reference to the special circumstances involved. In every jurisdiction there are partipular historical and
social factors that .call for individual treatment.
*Associate Professor of Finance, School of Business and Public Administration, Washington University.
1. See in particular ROBINSON AND NUGENT, REGULATION OF THE SMALL
LOAN BUSINESS (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1935); YOUNG, PERSONAL
FINANCE COMPANIES AND THEIR CREDIT PRACTICES (National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1939); State of New York Banking Department, SPECIAL REPORT OF THE
SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKS ON LICENSED LENDERS (State of N. Y. Bankers Department, 1946).
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Clearly, the essential basis of the problem is the existence of usury
statutes, which in turn have their origin in ancient, ecclesiastical, and medieval history. The limitation by law of the amount that can be charged for
the loan of money in itself contributes to the difficulty, but the establishment
of a single maximum without any attempt to differentiate between types of
loans complicates the problem seriously. To subject the pricing of a $300
personal loan to be repaid in eighteen equal monthly installments to the
same standards as a $50,000 seasonal inventory loan for a business is as
irrational as trying to regulate a drug store and a steel fabricator by the
same rules.
From an economic standpoint the justification of usury laws is based
upon the presumption that competition is ineffective in establishing a fair
price for credit. Therefore it is presumably necessary for the state's police
power to be evoked to protect its economically weaker members from willful
oppression and exploitation by its stronger. The uninformed or necessitous
borrower, in other words, must be protected from unscrupulous lenders who
would take advantage of their preferential bargaining position to gain undeserved reward at the expense of the former.
The statutory maxima established under usury laws, however, are intended only to guard against unconscionable action on the part of those not
guided by morals conforming to the group. They are not intended to establish a standard of fairness for each and every loan transaction. Competition and bargaining are still relied upon for this within the limits of the legal
maximum.
In keeping with this concept of the general purpose of usury laws, there
has developed in some circles the distinction between legal usury and inoral
usury. The inference implicit in the distinction is that a rate that may conform to law may nonetheless be unconscionable under the circumstances.
and conversely, a rate that may be morally sound could be illegal. The basis
for the distinction rests on the fact that there can be no single rate that is
right for all loans. The appropriate rate in any case is fundamentally a problem of economics and arithmetic. This point coristitutes the essence of the
whole problem of fair charges for loans and shall be the core of the later

discussion.
Unwillingness on the part of some to accept the fact that no single rate
can possibly be used for all loans can only be ascribed to confusion surrounding the meaning and nature of interest. This confusion, in turn, is the result
of failure to distinguish between interest and other prices and between mar-

ket rates of interest and the concept of "pure" interest.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss3/6
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Unlike every other price, interest is expressed in percentage terms
rather than money terms. That is why the problem was referred to above as
being partly one of arithmetic. A constant dollar amount of interest may
vary substantially in terms of rate if there is a variation in time and principal. Similarly a constant rate may vary immensely in monetary terms in
keeping with differences in principal and time. Whereas a dollar price conveys something definite in terms of comparative cost, such is not so with a
percentage figure. The very mathematical nature of interest, involving
three variables-cost, principal, and time-is a definite source of confusion
to many and obscures the realities of the problem involved.
Furthermore, interest is all too often judged in terms of being compensation for forebearance rather than a price for value received and costs incurred. The "pure" interest rate (or price for forebearance) has only a slight
bearing upon the actual rate charged. Much more significant are the factors
of risk and operating cost. The lending of money is not a sporadic, accidental
activity but rather a conscious business endeavor in which the usual economic motivations and management objectives apply. Pricing policy is governed by both cost and competitive considerations, and these will vary considerably by type of lending activity.
Since this business consideration is the heart of the whole question of
"fair" charges major attention must be given to the facts. The following
material reviews evidence pertaining to the costs of small loan operators.
Although this is admittedly only one area of the general field of consumer
lending, still it is the most meaningful. Because the small loan business has
been subject to thorough supervision in some states for long periods of time,
statistics on its operations are most reliable both from the standpoint of
supervision and time coverage. Also, the general principles to be brought out
in the small loan area, as opposed to the specific findings, will have applicability throughout the field.
COSTS OF CONSUMER LENDING OPERATIONS

As an introduction to an analysis of the costs incurred in extending consumer loans some background into the operating activities should be established. There are in general four functional categories to which the various
costs can be assigned for classification purposes. Probably the most important is that of acquisition, by which is meant all of the activities involved in
"getting the loan on the books." Included would be all advertising and
promotional activity, interviewing of applicants, providing for a written application, investigating the applicant's credit standing, checking any legal
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
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instruments involved as to their proper documentation, passing upon the
acceptance of the application, setting up the account on the books, and setting in motion the accounting routine for adequately controlling the subsequent servicing of the account. All of this requires substantial personnel,
time, equipment, and supplies.
The next most costly activity is that of servicing the account once it
has been established with the lender. Particularly is this of major importance
in the case of installment loans where periodic collection and recording is involved. Included are such individual operations as acceptance of payments
in person or by mail, recording of such payments on the accounting forms,
sending delinquent notices when a payment becomes overdue, making calls
in person or by telephone on old or repeat delinquents, holding special meetings by senior personnel to decide what action to take relative to particular
delinquents, and collecting over-due accounts by legal means when such
action has been chosen in place of straight charge-off. Again the principal
cost involved is that of personnel time with some additional expenses in the
form of legal fees, equipment, and supplies.
The third separate activity is that of termination. The individual operations involved are largely those of collecting and recording the principal
repayment, and to this extent it is similar to the servicing of an installment
payment. However, there are the additional considerations of cancelling
out the account file and placing it in an inactive file, properly cancelling all
documents drawn in connection with the loan, and returning the originals
to the borrower. In some individual cases, there may also be the need for
arranging for an extension or renewal in place of final cash payment. Although this is a most important phase of the lending process from the standpoint of both the lender and borrower, it does not account for a very substantial part of the total costs.
The final category of costs is general overhead. This includes such
items as rent, taxes, bad debts, interest, and insurance, as well as time devoted by top management in planning general policies and working with the
operating personnel. Except for the individual costs of bad debts and interest this general category is of particular significance to chain operators, where
the services provided by the head office in the way of establishing general
administrative policies, controlling branch operating procedures, centralizing
accounting controls, organizing accounting procedure, and providing the
necessary operating funds, enable the separate branches to operate with a
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss3/6
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total commitment of personnel and supplies less than is customarily requiree
in an independent office.
On the basis of this operating background it can be seen that the consumer lending business is primarily one engaged ni selling personal service.
It differs from the standard personal service business in selling substantial
capital service as well, but it does not go so far in this regard as the public
utilities. Also, there are a number of associated costs incurred, but nothing
like in the merchandising or manufacturing businesses. Statistical support
to these points is provided by the following exhibit, which expresses the
major expenses incurred by the Missouri and Illinois small loan licensees over
a multi-year period as a per cent of annual gross revenue. 2 The Missouri
averages cover the 13-year period from 1933-1945. The Illinois averages
are for the 17-year period 1930-1946.
TABLE I
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS REVENUE
MISSOURI AND ILLINOIS SMALL LOAN LICENSEES

(Based on Annual Aggregates)
Per Cent of Gross Revenue

Salaries
Rent
Advertising
Bad Debts
All Other
Total Operating Expenses
Income Taxess
Interest on Borrowed Funds3
1 Total Expenses
Net Profit
Total Revenue

Missouri
1933-45
1933-45
Average
Range
27.1
23.9-31.9
3.7
3.1- 4.6
6.5
5.9- 7.5
10.2
7.3-17.5
18.6
16.5-21.2
66.1
59.6-72.9
8.0
4.5-12.6
11.4
5.7-14.9
85.5
..............
14.5
8.6-22.8
100.0
..............

Illinois
1930-46
1930-46
Average
Range
28.2
25.5-31.9
4.5
3.9- 5.2
6.3
5.6- 7.5
9.8
6.7-17.8
14.1
9.0-19.6
62.9
54.5-69.0
8.8
4.0-13.1
6.1
4.2- 7.6
77.8
..............
22.2
17.3-27.7
100.0
..............

A general point of interest to be derived from this table is the marked
similarity between the operations of the two states. There are only two
items of any notable divergence, one is the All-Other category and the other
2. The Missouri results were calculated for this article from the annual
statistics contained in the Summary of Annual Reports of Personaw Finance Com-

panies of Missouri, compiled by the Department of Finance, State of Missouri. The
Illinois findings are drawn from the author's unpublished doctoral dissertation en-

titled The Importance of Direct Costs in the Granting of Consumer Installment

Credit, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, June, 1948.
3. Based on 14-year coverage in the case of Illinois instead of 17 because
of unavailability of data for early years.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
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is the Interest on Borrowed Funds. The first can be explained as a result
of differences between the two states in accounting for Charges Earned but
Not Collected. The Missouri figures include this as an added expense and
source of revenue while the Illinois do not. In fact, were the 4.1 per cent
average figure for this item in Missouri subtracted from the 18.6 per cent
average for All Other expenses, the resulting 14.5 per cent figure would very
closely approximate the Illinois experience. The difference in the interest
expense averages is much more difficult to explain. All that can be said is
that whereas the operating results for the two states are very similar, more
of the operating profits are distributed to the borrowed capital as opposed
to the owners' capital in the case of Missouri.
In any event, the Salaries item is seen to be by all odds the most important single cost, being almost twice as large in amount as the next largest
figure. When it is realized, further, that the All Other category is composed
of thirteen or more different minor items, no one of which averages out to be
of any real significance, the relative importance of the salary cost takes on
added meaning. On the basis of this more thorough information, what is
more, Bad Debts becomes the second most important single cost item.
There is good reason to believe that this condition is the peculiar result of
including both urban and rural offices in the one grouping. Had the offices
been segregated along this line, Advertising would have probably been the
second most important item for the urban offices with Bad Debts coming
third, although the difference would not have been very great.
Besides recognizing the special cost requirements of consumer lending
it is also important in resolving our problem to appreciate the relationship
of the costs to certain loan characteristics. Principal of these is the factor
of size. From what has been said about the operations involved in extending
credit on a business basis it should be clear that the costs involved are
governed mainly by the number of loans made rather than their size. Another way of saying it is that the costs are largely incurred on a per loan
basis rather than a dollar basis. An exception to this proposition has to be
granted, of course, if one thinks in terms of extremes. Much more care and
time will be devoted to the investigation of a $1,000,000 loan application
than to a $100 one. But even here the general principle applies, for the increased attention is not proportional to the increased size of loan. In the
above case, for example, nothing like 10,000 times as much attention would

be devotea to the larger loan, maybe -00 times or even 1,000, but certainly
not 10,000.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss3/6

6

Upton: Upton: Economics of Fair Charges
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 16

This raises a point of expression with which the author would like to
take exception. One quite often sees or hears it said that small loans are
more expensive to make than larger ones. This is an unfortunate way of
expressing the point because most people think in dollar terms when considering the expense of something. In terms of dollar costs small loans are
really less expensive than large ones; but the difference in dollar cost is no
way proportional to the difference in dollar size, and so the small loans are
proportionately more expensive. Or said another way, a given volume of
outstandings requires more loans and therefore more costs when the average
loan is small.
This point can be supported statistically by drawing on the record of
the Missouri Small Loan licensees again. The annual expense per account
averaged out at $24.90 for the 13-year period. This means that on the
basis of such average performance a $100 loan made for the duration of a
year would have to bear 25% annual charge if it is to cover just the costs
incurred. A $1000 loan for a year, on the other hand, could be serviced at
a rate of 2Y2 per annum exclusive of profit, assuming no difference in the
amount of attention that would be given the larger loan. Proof that this
hypothetical reasoning is not too far from reality can be had by further citing
Illinois small loan experience. The average of the total expenses as a per
cent of the value of loans outstanding at the end of each year for the period
1930-1946 was 25.16%. This means that if we can take the year-end
balances as reasonably representatives of the average outstandings, an
average rate of 25.16% was required just to break even. During the period
of time the average size loan made was $137.38, the maximum permissable
being limited to $300. 4
Another consumer loan characteristic which has distinct bearing upon
costs is that of method of repayment. An installment loan is substantially
more expensive to service than a single repayment one. The termination
costs of each are largely the same and yet the installment loan incurs
periodic collection and recording expenses in addition. It may be that the
installment feature is of sufficient advantage to both the borrower and the
lender to be worth this added cost, but the fact of added cost should not
4. The New York State Banking Department in its
SUPERINTENDENT

OF BANKS ON LICENSED LENDERS, op.

SPECIAL REPORT OF THE

cit. supra n. 1, offers further

evidence of the inverse relationship of rate to size of loan and relies upon this
evidence to recommend increasing the maximum loan size under the small loan
statute in its state to $500. The state of Illinois has also gone to a $500.00 limit
since 1946.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
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be overlooked. From the lender's standpoint, for example, installment repayment undoubtedly cuts down on the overall risk involved, but it does so
only at the price of additional expense of service.
The factor of collateral protection also has special cost significance.
To accomplish an effective lien requires the incurrence of special legal, appraisal, and recording fees. Also there are the additional costs of supplies
and clerical service. In some small loan operations where the security is
established in a rather automatic and perfunctory fashion these special
costs may be held to a minimum. But in those cases where rather specialized
individual treatment is accorded the borrower, they may loom very large.
Support of the point may be made by reference to other fields of credit.
In real estate finance the borrower is very aware of the costs attached to
providing an effective lien because he must pay them directly. And in the
general field of commercial credits, loans secured by receivables or inventory
are invariably more expensive to make and to obtain.
All of this leads us by indirection to a most important consideration
-that of the bearing of risk on the cost of loan granting. On an individual
loan basis a variation in the rate of interest charged by a lender cannot
possibly compensate for a presumed variation in the risk involved. A single
loan would never be granted if there were any likelihood that it wouldn't
be repaid, for no interest compensation could offset the loss of principal.
An analogy could be taken from insurance: no one would insure another's
life alone at the standard insurance rates, for such would merely involve
shifting the risk from one person to another. The insurance principle is
based upon the shifting of risk from the individual to the group, or what
might be more appropriately termed mutual sharing of a risk. So it is with
the risk of credit loss. Professional lenders perform an insurance function
in that they include in their rate an amount to cover bad debt losses which
cannot be related to individual loans but which can reasonably be predicted
in the aggregate on the basis of past experience.
Accordingly, some types of lending are more expensive than others as a
result of a higher general loss experience. Lenders which are more selective
in their credit risks can afford to charge a lower overall rate, whereas those
which are more promiscuous in their credit granting or specialize in high risk
loans are forced to charge a higher rate. This is not to say the overall risk
of the latter type business is greater than that of the former, only that of
the individual loans. That is, the loss ratio may be consistently higher, but
if it is predictable within reasonable limits the business risk is no greater.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss3/6
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Again the same holds true in the insurance field. The company that engages
or specializes in substandard risks does not assume any greater overall risk
but it must charge its customers higher premiums. Accordingly, individuals
who qualify as stafidard risks must suffer an unnecessary penalty if they buy
their insurance there.
As a general concluding point it can be said that the costs of consumer
lending possess the character which the economist would refer to as being
fixed in the short run but variable in the long run. Since the basic business
requirements are labor and money, both of which are very mobile over time,
it is possible for shifts to be made quickly and with only little loss when
changing business conditions of a rather durable sort dictate. On the
other hand, once an office is opened for business the major costs are set regardless of business volume. Therefore, within the limits of the personnel
force and physical facilities, the larger the volume the greater the profit.
Whether an office or department makes one loan or a hundred during a week
the total costs are practically the same.
Some studies have tried to support the thesis that in the small loan
field efficiency is dependent upon large-scale operation. So far as this contention is concerned these studies are subject to severe criticism. What they
do support, however, is the thesis that efficiency is dependent upon full
utilization of the personnel and facilities committed to a single office regardless of its size.
On this point alone the consumer lending business is no different from
any other credit business or even any other business. The efficiency of any
operation is dependent upon adequate utilization of its facilities. The unique
feature of the consumer loan business is its extreme mobility over time. This
potential flexibility in operation is decidedly advantageous. It is matched in
this regard only by some other financial institutions, such as brokerage
houses, commercial paper houses, sales finance companies, and commercial
credit companies.
While on the point of comparison with other businesses, it is well to
give attention to the comparative net profit results and their basis. Table
I shows an average net profit in relation to gross revenue of 14.5 per cent
for Missouri and 22.2 per cent for Illinois. These percentage figures alone
are meaningless. To judge the profitability of any business the return over
a reasonable length of time must be related to the average investment required to generate the revenue, not to the revenue itself. In this regard the
consumer lending business is similar to the public utility field-the amount
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
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of dollar investment needed is high in relation to annual revenue. Whereas
the annual net sales might be three or four times the average dollar investment in assets for a merchandising business, one or two times for a manufacturing business; in the case of utilities it will range more around 1/3 or Y
times. Expressed another way, a utility would have to earn from nine to
sixteen times as much on its revenue as a merchandising business to show
the same return on investment.
Applying this reasoning to the Missouri licensees we find that over the
thirteen-year period covered the annual ratio of revenue to operating assets
averaged out at .258.5 Since a total investment figure is involved, this "turnover" ratio needs to be related to the total investment return of net profit
plus interest on borrowed funds, which came to an average of .259 per cent
of gross revenue. Multiplying the two figures together we get an average
return on total operating assets of 6.68 per cent. That is, on every dollar
invested in the operations of the business 6.68 cents were earned every
year on the average for the Missouri industry in general. Naturally, some
individual companies showed better average results than others.
All too often undeserved significance is given to the profit margin of a
business. It is not uncommon for an electric power utility to realize a profit
of 30% of the gross revenue and more. This does not signify monopolistic
exploitation, for the return on investment may still be within the regulated
allowance of, say 6%. A high profit margin must be allowed when the investment turnover is low, if the industry is to function properly. On the
other hand, if, as in merchandising, annual turnover of total investment is
three or four times or more the profit margin will be as low as 4, 3, 2
per cent and even less.
On this basis alone the small loan business would not seem outstandingly profitable in comparison with other credit businesses or other industries in general. However, on a total investment return of this sort it is not
uncommon for an individual company to realize substantially more on its
ownership investment. The explanation for this rests on what is technically
known as capital structure leverage. It is the result of the way in which the
business is financed, not the way it is operated. When a business is able to
earn 7 per cent on its total investment and yet is able to borrow half of
this investment at a fixed rate of 4 per cent, the owners benefit to the extent
5. This is to be expected since the gross revenue arises from the rate charged,
which is a fraction of the principal sum when expressed on a year's basis.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss3/6
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of the difference and realize a total return of their own of 10 per cent. Had
they borrowed two-thirds of the total requirements at 4 per cent they would
have realized a return on their own investment of 13 per cent.
The classic example of applied leverage is in the commercial banking
business. Here an individual bank might earn only 1 per cent on its total
assets and yet show a 10-12 or even higher per cent return on its ownership
because of the extensive reliance upon depositors' funds. The reason why
loan companies are able to apply leverage to a greater extent than other
types of business is because of the highly liquid character of their assets
and the protection such affords the business creditors. However, it should
be recognized that there is a substantial risk element attached to the leverage factor. The principle works in both directions, and only a slight drop
in net profit can have a magnified effect upon the reduction of the rate of
return on the owners' investment.
BEARING OF COST CHARACTERISTICS

OF THE CONSUMER LENDING

BUSINESS ON THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM AT HAND

Having given consideration to the factor of costs in the making of
consumer loans, we are now concerned with how this knowledge contributes
to the resolving of the problem of fair charges. In the first place, it is clear
that the extension of consumer loans on a large-scale basis is an ordinary
business endeavor, being motivated by profit prospects on the one hand and
subject to cost and competitive considerations on the other. On the surface
this point might seem too elementary to justify special attention, but too
often the impression is given by some, either consciously or unconsiously,
that the whole activity has a special social demeanor, more akin to some
charitable or philanthropic undertaking than an ordinary business pursuit.
The fact of the matter is, as Professor Kelso has so well demonstrated in
his article, that there is a substantial consumer demand (both need and
want) for the service. That like any other service or good its use is neither
immoral nor improvident if kept within proper bounds. That for the demand to be satisfied in the most socially desirable manner legitimate private
enterprise in the field must be encouraged. And finally, in order to achieve
this end of encouraging private enterprise there must be provided the opportunity for charging a price which will cover all of the basic operating
costs, including an adequate return to the risk capital.
This is a rather general application of the factor of costs, however. A
much more pointed question is how to allow for an adequate price in the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
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field when the costs differ so in amount in accordance with variations in
loan characteristics. For one thing, regardless of the particular type of
consumer loan involved, the basic operating activities of acquisition, servicing, termination, and general overhead are the same. The main differences between types of consumer lenders is in the matter of risk assumed
and size of loan granted.
So far as this latter difference is concerned there is the possibility of
scaling rates by size. This is, in fact, an approach that has gained in popularity in recent years and the principle of which is at the heart of the
uniform small loan laws. The difficulty with it is that to be applied exactly
in conformance with the basic idea there would have to be a different rate
for each variation in dollar amount, and this clearly is administratively
unmanageable. 6 What is more, it would mean that the very smallest loans
would be priced at astronomical rates. Establishing broad brackets by
which to establish the rate variations does not overcome the difficulty but
merely hides it. Some loans continue to bear more than their proportionate
cost while others bear less, for it is to be remembered that most of the
costs are incurred on a per loan basis rather than a dollar basis.
To the extent that the factor of risk is inversely correlated to that
of size, which is to say that the small loans are the riskier and vice versa,
scaling of rates by size can also reckon with this basic difference in lending
activity. In this case, however, the difference that does exist is by broad
category rather than by single dollar variation, and so there is greater justification for bracket rates. On this point alone, rather than that of size
difference, the early specification of a $300 maximum in the Russell Sage
model code was well-founded. The more recent tendency to classify loans by
even smaller categories of size for rate purposes is also probably well conceived from the standpoint of coping with differences in risk but not for the
differences of size.
One suggestion for dealing with the size problem is that of covering
the operating costs mainly by fees and minimum charges and levying a
6. Proposal has been made for coping with the Missouri problem by adopting very narrow size brackets for variations in rates. For example, the Committee
for Enactment of Fair Lending Legislation in Missouri in its report dated January
12, 1949, recommended a triple-rate plan which in its application would have the
effect of varying the rate for every change in loan size between $100 and $2500.
Any bracket structure would have this same effect; the only difference is that the
average rate applicable would not be quoted in every case. The author feels that
too narrow limits in the brackets established make administration cumbersome
and the hope for reduced rates through price competition and discrimination remote.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss3/6
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nominal percentage rate in addition to cover the cost of forebearance and
those other minor expenses related to dollar size. In other words, there could
be a special investigation fee, a special legal fee to cover the costs of collateral protection, and a delinquency fee for overdue accounts requiring
special follow-up, all of which would be expressed in dollar terms. In addition, there would be a minimum dollar charge to cover the very smallest
accounts and a uniform percentage rate that would, be applied to the dollar
principal of every loan.
The approach is more administratively feasible than the bracket rate
scheme and has certain political attributes. In other words, it is a convenient expedient. On the other hand, it does not permit price comparison, and
therefore effective competition. Nor does it encourage the economical servicing of the smallest loans through price discrimination. Were the fixed
dollar fees converted into percentage form on some loans, the resulting rates
would be far above what would ordinarily seem appropriate. For this reason
the method may be realistic in terms of costs of granting small loans, but it
does not conform to the need for price comparison. The point was made in
the beginning of the article that because of the time factor the cost of credit
must be converted to a rate and not merely expressed in monetary amount.
This consideration leads to still another cost variable-the duration of
the loan. Just as a company specializing in small loans must charge a higher
average rate, so one specializing in short loans must do likewise. The common time interval for rate quotations being a year, loans having a term of
less than this are at a disadvantage when a flat rate is used and vice versa.
For example, a three-month loan will receive only one-fourth as much revenue as a full year's loan of the same size and charging the same rate. Or
looked at from another direction, a lender specializing in three-month loans
will incur four times as much acquisition cost as one specializing in year
loans and having the same volume of outstandings. There is one compensating factor, and that is the item of risk. All other things being equal, the
shorter loan offers greater safety to the lender. But rarely is the saving
sufficient to counteract the decided disadvantage of higher overall acquisition costs.
All this leads to the central question, "How can a fair charge for consumer loans be determined?" On the basis of what has been said it should
be clear that there can be no categorical answer to this question. Whether
or not a charge is fair depends for one thing upon the average loan size
of the lender togther with the average loan duration and any other special
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service offered the borrower or special cost incurred by the lender, primary of
which would be risk involved.
The question of fairness also is related to the public's attitude as to how
small the loans are to go. This consideration is directly tied in with the average loan size and the desire to encourage the legitimate extension of consumer loans in the first place. If the legislators have in mind servicing the
needs of those who might want $10.00 loans, then one of two things must
conform to this objective. Either the lender must be permitted to charge the
same rate on much larger loans, that is the average loan size must be substantially above this minimum figure, or if he is to be made to specialize in
very small loans, the permissible rate must accordingly be very high. This
is indeed a question that many legislatures have not faced up to squarely.
General statements are made as to the need for providing legislation which
will permit the extension of "small loans," but the question, "How small?"
is a most vital complementary consideration."
This problem raises another inescapable dilemma that the legislature must recognize and take an unequivocal position on. If the very
smallest loans are to be granted readily at what would seem reasonable
rates, the larger loans must be charged at rates higher than is justified by
their pro-rata share of the costs. In other words, price discrimination must
not only be accepted but encouraged. The larger loans must subsidize the
smaller, as it were. At first glance this might seem a somewhat uncouth solution. Investigation into pricing policy of almost any type of business,
however, will evidence a certain amount of price discrimination. In the case
of the lending business in general it is rather pronounced. And in the small
consumer loan business it is imperative. The question to be faced by the
legislature is not whether it is to be permitted but rather the extent to which
it should be carried. The lower the maximum rate permitted the greater the
area of price discrimination that will be required if very small loans are
to be available.
7. This point is well stated in the report of the committee appointed to investigate money-lending agencies of the House of Representatives of the 62nd
Missouri Legislative Assembly. It reads, "The problem is not adequately met
merely by establishing a rate sufficient to keep licensed small loan companies in
business within the state. Further than that, the rate must be sufficiently high
to render a full and complete loan service. That is, the rate must be sufficient to
encourage the making of loans in the lowest brackets as well as the larger loans and
to provide a loan service for borrowers who do not have 'gilt-edged' collateral or
whose circumstances are such that they cannot be classified as A-1 credit risks."
House Journal, 62nd General Assembly, 1943, Missouri, Vol. II.
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In support of this point some hypothetical reasoning might be offered.
If we take an average cost per loan outstanding over a representative period
of time and relate ft to different average annual loan sizes we can get some
idea of the different rates that must be charged. The $24.90 average annual
expense per account for the Missouri loan operators from 1933-1945, which
was cited earlier, is exclusive of interest and profit. If a 6 per cent return
on total investment be considered reasonable, at a rate of investment turnover of 25 per cent, a profit margin (after taxes but before interest) of 24
per cent would be required. This would mean that roughly 25 per cent of
gross revenue would have to be provided over and above total operating
costs and taxes. And the total cost per loan (including a reasonable return
to capital investment) would approximate $33.20 ($24.90 plus /3 of $24.90).
At this cost a $10 loan for a year would have to be priced at 332%,
if it were to bear its pro-rata share. Were the duration but for three months
instead of a year the rate would have to amount to 1328%. A $100 year
loan could be serviced at 33.20%, but if it were repaid in equal monthly installments the rate would have to almost double because of the gradual
decline in principal balance over time.
Over the 13-year period the average loan size for Missouri was
$111.22. On this average balance an average rate of 29.85%o would have
been required to cover total costs of $33.20 per account. Had the maximum
rate permitted been lower, the average loan balance would have had to be
higher. Or were the average balance permitted to be higher, the rate could
have been lower. Had the average balance been $200, for example, the
average rate charged could have been 16.60%. And an average balance of
$400 could have been serviced at 8.30o. Such reductions in rates, however,
can only be accomplished by increased. price discrimination. With each such
change the small loans bear less of their pro-rata share of the costs and the
large loans bear more.
One final factor related to costs and the establishment of "fair rates"
which has been given very little attention in the treatment of the small loan
problem is that of the proper role of competition. Here as in other areas
of our economy we have taken the fatalistic position that competition is not
only inoperative but malignant. And, in consequence, though we espouse
competion in principle we do all we can to create monopolistic situations
in practice. Instead of developing these monopolistic centers and then
regulating them, it would seem much more logical and in keeping with our
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basic philosophy to regulate a business only within broad limits while taking
definite measures to improve the competitive opportunities.
Although this approach is not possible with all businesses it would
certainly seem to have virtue in the consumer loan business. Granted that
the weakness in this regard has always been the ignorance of the borrower,
from the cost or general economic standpoint few businesses lend themselves
so well to the automatic regulatory aspect of competition. And the defective position of the consumer is just the thing that can most easily be overcome by a positive educational and institutional program. The substantial
improvement over the last thirty years in the willingness of consumers to
shop for credit and to appraise alternative credit sources intelligently is
strong testimony to what can be accomplished in this regard.
In the absence of effective competition there is no way of determining a
fair charge. The greatest economist would be unable to provide an absolute
answer for even an individual case; so it should be clear that a government
cannot establish a general statute that will provide equity in all cases. To a
great extent the question is resolved in the subconscious of the user. Since
we all have different tastes and wants, to establish dogmatically the equity
of another's transaction is to assume the role of the "benevolent dictator"
with all of its insidious implications. Even from the objective cost standpoint, an individual, no matter how well trained, could not possibly anticipate all of the potential means of realizing economies of operation and all
of the possible changes in consumer needs. Without effective competition
there can be no absolute equity, all that a regulatory body can do is prevent
flagrant abuse.
In regulating rates charged for consumer loans, therefore, the legislative. body must take into account its ability, willingness, and. determination to encourage competition as an automatic determiner of fairness. If
competition is to be relied upon and fostered then all that may be called
for is a general increase in the maximum rate allowable and a prohibition
of certain malpractices. If the social force of competition is to be ignored,
then what must follow is a rather arbitrary stratification of the business
in all of its basic operating phases, in which case inequities are not removed
but rather contained in narrow limits.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
All market rates of interest are based upon the summation of four
inescapable cost factors: (1) pure interest, or the cost of forebearance,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss3/6
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(2) risk, (3) operating expenses, including acquisition, servicing, termination, and overhead, and (4) profit. In other words, the lending of money
is an ordinary business operation involving the same general economic motivations and considerations as the selling of shoes, the practicing of law, the
manufacturing of watches-or any other well-accepted business undertaking.
Naturally, it has certain operating requirements which are rather special to
itself, but these individual operating particulars should not be permitted to
obscure its basic business character in general.
Such being the case, successful regulation of the business requires a
thorough knowledge and appreciation of all the intricacies of its demand and
cost relationships. Particularly does this hold true if competition is either
impotent or ignored. Too often in the past has there been evidence of regulatory measures which have been motivated by prejudice and founded upon
ignorance. If the widespread consumer demand for the service is to be accomodated most effectively, this consumer expression must be respected and
legitimate private lenders encouraged.
This attitude, in turn, means that the legislative authority must recognize the major issues and assume a definite stand in regard to them. If
small loans are to be encouraged, how small should they be? Is there to be
different treatment for different sizes of loans, or shall each loan bear its
own pro-rata dollar cost? If there is different treatment by loan size, will
it be limited by certain fixed brackets? If so, what objective standards will
be used as guides in the setting of these limits? Will there be classification
of loans by risk as well as by size? By duration? By method of repayment?
By type of collateral protection? And finally, is competition going to be
relied upon at all as an automatic market determinant of equity?
If an individual reads this article with the expectation of being told
what exact rate is fair for consumer loans or even for particular types of
consumer loans, his frustration would be at the exploding point by nowif, indeed, he would bother to continue this far. Such an individual, however, is blind to the realities of the situation and ignorant of the multitude
of variables that bear upon the question. What is even worse, his inclinations make him an easy victim of the glib "scientist" and vulnerable to the
incongruous philosophy of the "Benevolent Dictator." An individual transaction may possibly be judged "fair" on its own merits by the application of
broad standards, but certainly no general position can possibly be established that will provide for absolute equity in all cases. The most that can
be done on a broad scale is avoid gross inequity in some cases.
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In short, those who seek an absolute answer to the question, "What
is a fair charge?" are caught by the confusion and prejudice long associated
with the pricing of money. There is no single fair charge; a charge is only
fair when it conforms to all the special circumstances involved, namely, the
value of the loan to the borrower, his ability to pay, and the costs incurred
in making the service available. The economic considerations are therefore

paramount in judging fairness, but the science of economics can provide no
generally definitive answer.
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